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Abstract: Evolutionary altruism (defined in terms of fitness effects) exists in the context of 
punishment in addition to helping. We examine the proximate psychological mechanisms that 
motivate altruistic helping and punishment, including the effects of genetic relatedness, potential 
for future interactions, and individual differences in propensity to help and punish. A cheater 
who is a genetic relative provokes a stronger emotional reaction than a cheater who is a stranger, 
but the behavioral response is modulated to avoid making the transgression public in the case of 
cheating relatives. Numerous behavioral differences are not accompanied by emotional 
differences, suggesting that other psychological mechanisms dictate the specific response to 
emotion-provoking events. Paradoxically, there is a positive correlation between temptation to 
cheat and propensity to punish others for cheating, leading to a concept of “selfish punishment” 
that has been substantiated by a computer simulation model. This study demonstrates that 
fictional scenarios can provide an important methodological tool for studying the psychological 
basis of helping and punishment.   
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Introduction 
 
Altruism and punishment are often contrasted with each other in discussions of human 
social behavior. An altruist helps others as an end in itself and does not require the threat of 
punishment. Punishment imposes a cost on non-altruists, making the more selfish alternatives 
prohibitive.  
The recently coined phrase altruistic punishment reflects the fact that punishment is often 
costly for the individual who punishes in addition to the one who is punished (Bowles and 
Gintis, 2004; Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, and Richerson, 2003). In addition, the benefits of curtailing 
selfish activities by punishment are often shared by a larger group that includes but is not 
restricted to the punisher. When these conditions are met, punishment becomes an act of altruism 
in the evolutionary sense of the word, by increasing the fitness of others at the expense of one’s 
own fitness, or in economic terms by providing a public good at private expense.   
To clarify the concept of altruistic punishment, consider a n-person game theory model in 
which individuals vary for two traits, helping (H) vs. non-helping (NH) and punishing (P) vs. 
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non-punishing (NP), yielding four strategies: H/P, H/NP, NH/P, and NH/NP. The presence of 
punishers reduces the fitness of non-helpers and the incidence of non-helping, either by 
suppressing their behavior or by causing them to leave the group, to the benefit all helpers in the 
group (not just the punishers). Given these assumptions, it is always the case that H/NP is more 
fit than H/P within a single group if there is any cost of punishment. Something must be added to 
the model to make punishment evolutionarily stable, such as between-group selection (Bowles 
and Gintis, 2004), punishing the non-punishers (which seems to lead to an infinite regress), or 
conformance cultural transmission (Panchanathan and Boyd, 2004; Fehr, 2004). It is also 
possible that punishment is evolutionarily unstable in modern social environments, requiring 
ancestral conditions such as small groups of related individuals that are no longer present 
(Johnson, Stopka, and Knights, 2003). 
These debates about the altruistic nature of punishment are based entirely on fitness 
effects.  Philosophers and psychologists have traditionally defined altruism in terms of motives, 
or, in evolutionary terms, the proximate psychological mechanisms that motivate behaviors 
(Sober and Wilson, 1998). From this perspective it is obvious that punishment is motivated by 
very different psychological mechanisms (e.g., anger and moral outrage) than the helping 
behaviors typically associated with altruism (e.g., empathy and sympathy).  
Recently, O’Gorman, Wilson and Miller (2005) reported an intriguing difference in the 
psychological response to fictional scenarios that invoke altruistic helping and altruistic 
punishment. The altruistic helping response was sensitive to genetic relatedness and potential for 
future interactions, as expected for all forms of altruism (defined in terms of fitness effects) 
based on kin selection and reciprocity theory. The altruistic punishment response was insensitive 
to these variables, even though the individuals were clearly motivated to punish in a way that 
would benefit others at their own expense. O’Gorman et al. measured the psychological response 
to the fictional scenarios with a relatively small number of questions, such as “How much would 
you pay to punish the transgressor?” for the punishment scenarios and “How much would you 
pay to help the person?” in the helping scenarios. In this study, we investigate the psychological 
mechanisms associated with helping vs. punishment in more detail by having the participants 
respond to an inventory of words connoting emotion and action. Before proceeding, however, it 
is important to justify the use of fictional scenarios as an experimental research method.  
 
A comment on methods 
 
 Experimental economists have had a large impact on the study of human social behavior, 
including the concept of altruistic punishment (e.g., Bowles and Gintis, 2004, Fehr 2004). While 
their interests overlap broadly with those of social and evolutionary psychologists, they tend to 
adhere to two strong methodological norms; a) never use deception, and b) participants must 
actually play the games with each other and receive monetary payment. By these standards, 
experimental economists discount much of the social and evolutionary psychological literature, 
including the use of fictional scenarios, as methodologically flawed. We think that these norms 
are unduly restrictive and themselves need to be critiqued.  We are not arguing against the study 
of “real” behavior and monetary payment, of course, but rather for a diversity of research 
methods. As Robert Putnam (1992, p. 12) put it, “The prudent social scientist, like the wise 
investor, must rely on diversification to magnify the strengths, and offset the weaknesses, of any 
single instrument.” 
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 The norm against deception is based upon the erosion of trust. Even though a single 
experiment might gain from the use of deception, it cultivates an attitude of mistrust in the 
participant population. This is a legitimate problem that needs to be taken seriously by the social 
scientific community. The norm about “real” behavior and monetary payment is more difficult to 
justify. The whole thrust of the experimental economics literature is that human behavior cannot 
be explained by the utility maximizing principle of rational choice theory. People are not driven 
entirely by monetary concerns but by psychological mechanisms that must be discovered 
experimentally. Altruistic punishers, for example, are motivated to punish transgressions even at 
their own monetary expense. If so, then it is ironic to insist that participants will lack motivation 
unless they receive monetary payment.  Participants need to make a good faith effort, which 
requires motivation, but monetary payment only serves as a means to this end. Monetary 
payment can even undermine motives to cooperate by transforming a normative situation into a 
market transaction in the minds of the participants (Mulder, van Dijk, De Cremer, and Wilke, 
2006).   
 As for the necessity of studying “real” behavior, this assumes that mental responses to 
fictional scenarios and other hypothetical situations are somehow “unreal.” Scientists from 
diverse fields are beginning to recognize the importance of narratives in human psychological 
and cultural processes. At the neurobiological level, there is evidence that vicarious events are 
processed by the same circuits as actual events (Bechara, 2002; Berthoz, Armony, Blair, and 
Dolan, 2002). At the level of individual cognition, narratives are constructed internally to 
organize experience and rehearse alternative courses of actions (e.g., Bruner, 2002; Cosmides 
and Tooby 2000; Pennebaker and Seagal 1999). Above the level of the individual, narratives are 
essential for social transmission and the organization of culture (e.g., Sternberg 1998; Wilson 
2002). Even when responses to fictional scenarios do not correspond directly to responses to 
real-world events, they can reveal psychological mechanisms that motivate real-world behavior 
in a more complex fashion. The fact that stories engage such interest is a clue to their 
psychological relevance. It is as if the mind is designed to avidly seek and process information in 
the form of stories, providing a form of motivation that can equal or exceed monetary payment. 
 Against this background, it is possible to justify a rigorous scientific methodology based 
on fictional scenarios, which includes the following elements (see also Wilson and O’Gorman, 
2003):  
1) Construct a fictional scenario based on the subject of interest (in our case altruistic 
helping and punishment).  
2) Create alternative versions of the scenario that alter key independent variables (in our 
case, helping vs. punishment, genetic relatives vs. strangers, and potential vs. no potential for 
future interactions).  
3) Measure the response to the independent variables with a number of hypothesis-
oriented questions, such as willingness to invest one’s own resources to help or punish in our 
case.  
4) In addition to focused questions, we also recommend a more general exploration of 
emotions and actions elicited by the fictional scenarios (Wilson and O’Gorman, 2003). This can 
be accomplished by asking one set of participants how they would feel and act, using their open-
ended responses to generate a list of emotion and action words, and then measuring the responses 
of a second set of participants to these words on a numerical scale. This method has the 
advantage of sampling the emotional and behavioral repertoires of the participant population, 
including mechanisms and strategies that might not have occurred to the investigators.  
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5) It is important to include measures of individual differences among the participants.  
Behavioral responses to experimental economics games are profoundly variable, whether the 
games are virtual or real. Some individuals cooperate while other cheat; some punish while 
others refrain. Psychological differences presumably underlie these behavioral differences, 
which can be investigated with fictional scenarios.  
6) Finally, studies involving response to fictional scenarios should be integrated with 
studies involving response to real-world events, since the relationship between them might well 
be complex and indirect rather than simple and direct.   
To summarize, fictional scenarios easily deserve to be one of the tools in the social 
scientific toolkit. With these general comments in mind, we can proceed to our particular study.    
 
Methods 
 
The fictional scenario asked the reader to imagine joining an investment club whose 
members contribute $1000 each to play the stock market. In the punishment version, the 
investments break even except for a cheater who is discovered to have concealed $200 in profits 
for himself or herself (the wording was gender neutral). In the helping version, the investments 
break even and one member is discovered to need help with emergency medical costs. In both 
versions, genetic relatedness was manipulated by describing the members as cousins vs. 
strangers. Potential for future interactions was manipulated by describing the cheater or member 
needing help as still present or having moved to another town (see O’Gorman et al., 2005, for 
details). 
In addition to the basic questions used by O’Gorman et al. (2005), we asked an initial set 
of volunteer student participants (N=15; 6 females, 9 males) to list words that indicate “how 
would you feel?” and “how would you act?” in response to the scenarios. Their lists were 
merged to create the emotion and action words shown in Table 1 for the punishment scenario and 
Table 2 for the helping scenario. When compiling the word lists, we erred on the side of 
“splitting” rather than “lumping” since words that seemed synonymous to us might be different 
in the minds of the participants. These lists can be regarded as the emotional and behavioral 
repertoire of the participant population, sampled without respect to any particular hypothesis (see 
Wilson and O’Gorman, 2003, for additional discussion).  
The quantitative study was conducted on 330 undergraduate students from Binghamton 
University’s human subject pool (183 females, 126 males, 21 unrecorded) who participated for 
course research credit as part of a mass testing session. The punishment and helping scenarios 
and four treatments within each scenario (cousins vs. unrelated and still present vs. moved away) 
were distributed in random order and each participant responded to a single scenario. After 
reading the scenario, participants responded to the basic questions and indicated how they would 
feel and act by responding to the emotion and action words on a scale of  1 (not at all) to 9 (very 
much).  
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Table 1: Initial questions and emotion/action inventory for the punishment scenario. 
 
 
Note: Rows indicate the initial survey questions and emotion and action words. Columns indicate 
the mean value (with standard deviation in parentheses) of dollar amounts (for rows 3-4) or 
agreement on a 9 point scale (for all other rows) when the cheater was a relative vs. a stranger, 
presence vs. absence of potential for future interactions, and the response of male and female 
participants.  The final three columns indicate the main effects of an ANOVA (* = <.05, ** = 
<.01, *** = <.001, **** = <.0001). Full statistical results are available upon request. 
Relative Stranger Future No Future Male Female
Relative 
vs. 
Stranger
Present 
vs. 
Absent
Male   vs. 
Female
Basic questions
How sorry would you feel? 7.23(1.54) 6.77(1.87) 7.08(1.74) 6.93(1.70) 6.84(1.81) 7.16(1.69)
How likely would you be to help? 7.23(1.58) 6.48(1.98) 7.02(1.70) 6.70(1.94) 6.73(1.90) 6.98(1.83) **
What is the most money that you would contribute? 1807(3181) 602(1283) 1286(2449) 1157(2606) 1655(3137) 913(1904) **
How angry at those unwilling to help? 5.22(2.44) 5.23(2.18) 5.36(2.17) 5.08(2.45) 4.85(2.33) 5.46(2.32)
Emotion words
Apathetic 3.57(2.45) 4.04(2.59) 4.03(2.66) 3.55(2.36) 4.16(2.42) 3.53(2.60)
Concerned 6.69(2.02) 6.38(2.03) 6.64(2.12) 6.43(1.93) 6.14(2.04) 6.85(2.03) *
Disdainful 2.89(1.88) 2.93(1.68) 3.05(1.82) 2.77(1.74) 2.93(1.67) 2.78(1.81)
Empathetic 6.07(2.42) 5.75(2.39) 6.20(2.15) 5.61(2.61) 5.68(2.36) 6.07(2.52)
Foolish 3.42(2.32) 3.36(1.94) 3.34(2.00) 3.45(2.28) 3.64(2.31) 3.26(2.06)
Hopeful 6.42(2.34) 6.00(2.35) 6.19(2.59) 6.10(2.31) 6.06(2.48) 6.24(2.52)
Irresponsible 3.32(2.45) 3.44(2.28) 3.37(2.35) 3.39(2.39) 3.73(2.50) 3.21(2.30)
Nothing 2.20(1.76) 2.76(2.50) 2.74(2.31) 2.21(1.98) 2.58(1.89) 2.46(2.39)
Passive 2.65(1.87) 3.45(2.11) 2.86(1.91) 3.23(2.13) 3.24(1.97) 2.93(2.11) **
Pity 5.85(2.41) 6.13(2.12) 5.67(2.31) 6.32(2.19) 6.06(2.34) 5.92(2.28)
Sad 6.28(2.02) 6.12(2.22) 6.08(2.18) 6.33(2.05) 6.31(2.09) 6.14(2.17)
Scornful 2.61(2.07) 2.50(1.87) 2.52(1.81) 2.59(2.14) 2.72(2.16) 2.43(1.88)
Sorry 6.55(2.16) 6.30(2.26) 6.18(2.34) 6.70(2.04) 6.52(2.14) 6.37(2.32)
Sympathetic 6.74(2.25) 6.69(2.10) 6.71(2.25) 6.72(2.11) 6.56(2.20) 6.80(2.21)
Unconcerned 2.74(2.09) 2.97(2.20) 2.86(1.12) 2.84(2.18) 3.34(2.32) 2.56(2.04) *
Worried 6.12(2.37) 5.84(2.23) 6.09(2.34) 5.87(2.28) 5.71(2.33) 6.24(2.27)
Action words
Act rude 1.70(1.30) 1.75(1.20) 1.67(1.28) 1.77(1.22) 1.91(1.32) 1.60(1.21)
Act standoffish 2.38(2.11) 3.16(1.97) 2.73(1.88) 2.78(1.86) 2.91(1.87) 2.63(1.85) **
Assist in fundraising 6.78(2.38) 5.88(2.41) 6.68(2.18) 6.01(2.38) 6.17(2.42) 6.56(2.17) *
By mildly helpful 4.34(1.97) 4.77(2.10) 4.45(2.17) 4.65(2.35) 4.96(2.30) 4.18(2.16) *
Express sympathy 7.37(2.06) 7.10(2.02) 7.23(1.93) 7.25(2.08) 7.00(2.20) 7.40(1.86)
Find out expenses 6.92(1.51) 5.90(2.47) 6.75(2.18) 6.11(2.42) 6.58(2.31) 6.39(2.33) **
Help if very serious 8.07(2.19) 7.36(1.92) 7.71(1.61) 7.74(1.89) 7.71(1.87) 7.76(1.70) *
Lend money 6.52(2.01) 5.62(2.30) 6.21(2.07) 5.74(2.44) 5.88(2.26) 6.03(2.30)
Not bring it up 3.07(2.69) 3.76(2.09) 3.25(1.92) 3.55(2.22) 3.66(2.21) 3.20(2.01) *
See if they ask for help 4.90(2.69) 5.50(2.08) 4.93(2.39) 5.45(2.46) 5.03(2.25) 5.16(2.58)
Try to help 7.32(1.75) 6.44(2.30) 7.06(2.00) 6.73(2.14) 6.88(2.19) 6.97(2.01) **
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Table 2: Initial questions and emotion/action inventory for helping scenario. 
 
 
Note: Rows indicate the initial survey questions and emotion and action words. Columns indicate 
the mean value (with standard deviation in parentheses) of dollar amounts (for row 3) and 
agreement on a 9 point scale (for all other rows) when the person needing help was a relative vs. 
a stranger, presence vs. absence of potential for future interactions, and the response of male and 
female participants.  The final three columns indicate the main effects of an ANOVA (* = 
<.05, ** = <.01, *** = <.001, **** = <.0001). Full statistical results are available upon request. 
 
Results 
 
For the questions that they share in common, the results of this study are largely 
consistent with those of O’Gorman et al. (2005), as shown for the punishment scenario in Figure 
1. It is important to show the full distribution of responses because they are highly non-normal 
and informative in their own right. The most frequent response to question 1 (“how angry would 
you feel toward this person?”) was the maximum response of 9 (Figure 1A). The desire to punish 
was also strong, peaking at a value of 7 (Figure 1B). Most participants thought that the cheater 
should pay back what was stolen (the modal value is $200) but some indicated much more 
(Figure 1C). Despite the anger and desire to punish reported in questions 1 and 2, the amount 
that the subjects were willing to pay to punish was highly variable (Figure 1D), including 54% 
who were unwilling to pay anything and a few individuals who indicated willingness to pay 
exorbitant amounts. Anger toward non-punishers was more muted than toward the cheater but 
still reached high values for some individuals (Figure 1E). Finally, most participants felt that 
they would not be tempted to cheat in this situation but a sizeable proportion was tempted to 
varying degrees (Figure 1F). 
  
Relative Stranger Future No Future Male Female
Relative 
vs. 
Stranger
Present 
vs. 
Absent
Male   vs. 
Female
Basic questions
How sorry would you feel? 7.23(1.54) 6.77(1.87) 7.08(1.74) 6.93(1.70) 6.84(1.81) 7.16(1.69)
How likely would you be to help? 7.23(1.58) 6.48(1.98) 7.02(1.70) 6.70(1.94) 6.73(1.90) 6.98(1.83) **
What is the most money that you would contribute? 1807(3181) 602(1283) 1286(2449) 1157(2606) 1655(3137) 913(1904) **
How angry at those unwilling to help? 5.22(2.44) 5.23(2.18) 5.36(2.17) 5.08(2.45) 4.85(2.33) 5.46(2.32)
Emotion words
Apathetic 3.57(2.45) 4.04(2.59) 4.03(2.66) 3.55(2.36) 4.16(2.42) 3.53(2.60)
Concerned 6.69(2.02) 6.38(2.03) 6.64(2.12) 6.43(1.93) 6.14(2.04) 6.85(2.03) *
Disdainful 2.89(1.88) 2.93(1.68) 3.05(1.82) 2.77(1.74) 2.93(1.67) 2.78(1.81)
Empathetic 6.07(2.42) 5.75(2.39) 6.20(2.15) 5.61(2.61) 5.68(2.36) 6.07(2.52)
Foolish 3.42(2.32) 3.36(1.94) 3.34(2.00) 3.45(2.28) 3.64(2.31) 3.26(2.06)
Hopeful 6.42(2.34) 6.00(2.35) 6.19(2.59) 6.10(2.31) 6.06(2.48) 6.24(2.52)
Irresponsible 3.32(2.45) 3.44(2.28) 3.37(2.35) 3.39(2.39) 3.73(2.50) 3.21(2.30)
Nothing 2.20(1.76) 2.76(2.50) 2.74(2.31) 2.21(1.98) 2.58(1.89) 2.46(2.39)
Passive 2.65(1.87) 3.45(2.11) 2.86(1.91) 3.23(2.13) 3.24(1.97) 2.93(2.11) **
Pity 5.85(2.41) 6.13(2.12) 5.67(2.31) 6.32(2.19) 6.06(2.34) 5.92(2.28)
Sad 6.28(2.02) 6.12(2.22) 6.08(2.18) 6.33(2.05) 6.31(2.09) 6.14(2.17)
Scornful 2.61(2.07) 2.50(1.87) 2.52(1.81) 2.59(2.14) 2.72(2.16) 2.43(1.88)
Sorry 6.55(2.16) 6.30(2.26) 6.18(2.34) 6.70(2.04) 6.52(2.14) 6.37(2.32)
Sympathetic 6.74(2.25) 6.69(2.10) 6.71(2.25) 6.72(2.11) 6.56(2.20) 6.80(2.21)
Unconcerned 2.74(2.09) 2.97(2.20) 2.86(1.12) 2.84(2.18) 3.34(2.32) 2.56(2.04) *
Worried 6.12(2.37) 5.84(2.23) 6.09(2.34) 5.87(2.28) 5.71(2.33) 6.24(2.27)
Action words
Act rude 1.70(1.30) 1.75(1.20) 1.67(1.28) 1.77(1.22) 1.91(1.32) 1.60(1.21)
Act standoffish 2.38(2.11) 3.16(1.97) 2.73(1.88) 2.78(1.86) 2.91(1.87) 2.63(1.85) **
Assist in fundraising 6.78(2.38) 5.88(2.41) 6.68(2.18) 6.01(2.38) 6.17(2.42) 6.56(2.17) *
By mildly helpful 4.34(1.97) 4.77(2.10) 4.45(2.17) 4.65(2.35) 4.96(2.30) 4.18(2.16) *
Express sympathy 7.37(2.06) 7.10(2.02) 7.23(1.93) 7.25(2.08) 7.00(2.20) 7.40(1.86)
Find out expenses 6.92(1.51) 5.90(2.47) 6.75(2.18) 6.11(2.42) 6.58(2.31) 6.39(2.33) **
Help if very serious 8.07(2.19) 7.36(1.92) 7.71(1.61) 7.74(1.89) 7.71(1.87) 7.76(1.70) *
Lend money 6.52(2.01) 5.62(2.30) 6.21(2.07) 5.74(2.44) 5.88(2.26) 6.03(2.30)
Not bring it up 3.07(2.69) 3.76(2.09) 3.25(1.92) 3.55(2.22) 3.66(2.21) 3.20(2.01) *
See if they ask for help 4.90(2.69) 5.50(2.08) 4.93(2.39) 5.45(2.46) 5.03(2.25) 5.16(2.58)
Try to help 7.32(1.75) 6.44(2.30) 7.06(2.00) 6.73(2.14) 6.88(2.19) 6.97(2.01) **
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These results indicate that the fictional scenarios were successful at engaging a strong 
psychological response from the participants. The surprising result of O’Gorman et al. (2005) 
was that the response was not influenced by genetic relatedness or potential for future 
interaction, at least in terms of the basic questions listed in rows 1-6 of Table 1. This result must 
be revised for genetic relatedness, although not for future interactions, on the basis of the present 
study. Not only was there a minor effect of genetic relatedness for the basic question “How 
angry would you feel?”, but numerous effects were revealed by the inventory of emotion and 
action words. With respect to emotions, in addition to feeling more angry, participants also felt 
more betrayed, disappointed, disgusted, hurt, and shocked at cheating by a cousin than by a 
stranger. With respect to action, participants indicated a greater likelihood of confronting and 
seeking an apology from a relative than a stranger, they but were more likely to warn others of a 
stranger than a relative. With respect to sex differences, men indicated a greater willingness to 
demand money, ostracize, physically hurt, threaten, and yell at the cheater than women.  
The distribution of responses to the first four questions of the helping scenario are shown 
in Figure 2, indicating a strong empathetic response (2A) and desire to help (2B), a highly 
skewed distribution in the amount willing to pay (2C), and the full spectrum of anger toward 
others not willing to help (2D). The first four lines of Table 2 show that genetic relatedness 
strongly influences desire to help and amount of money contributed (similar to the previous 
study) but no effect of potential for future interactions (unlike the previous study). The inventory 
of emotion and action words enable the psychological response to helping to be examined in 
more detail. Surprisingly, the effect of genetic relatedness did not take place at the level of 
emotional response (with the exception of the word “passive”) but primarily at the level of 
behavioral response. Participants reported a greater willingness to help cousins than strangers, 
but not because they had a greater emotional response to their dilemma. With respect to sex 
differences females exhibited greater concern and willingness to help than males.  
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Figure 1. Histograms indicating dollar amounts (1C and 1D) and agreement on a nine-point 
scale (all other graphs) to the basic questions of the punishment scenario.  
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Figure 2. Histograms indicating dollar amounts (2C) and agreement on a nine-point scale (all 
other graphs) to the basic questions of the helping scenario. 
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Individual differences in altruistic punishment and helping 
 
To examine individual differences in willingness to punish at one’s own expense, we 
used the item “What is the most you would be willing to pay to punish this person?” as the 
dependent variable in three stepwise multiple regression analyses. In the first, the other five basic 
questions were used as the independent variables. The total R2 was .26 (df=153, F=14.7, 
p<.0001) with four variables retained in the following order  (parentheses report the t-ratio, 
significance value, and incremental effect on the total R2 value):  How much the cheater should 
pay (t=5.10, p<.0001, DR2=.16), the subject’s temptation to cheat  (t=2.29, p=.0007, DR2=.06), 
anger toward non-punishers (t=2.82, p=.0374, DR2=.02), and anger toward the cheater (t=-2.58, 
p=.011, DR2=.03).  The second and fourth variables are counterintuitive; evidently, willingness 
to pay to punish the cheater is positively related to one’s own temptation to cheat and negatively 
related to anger toward the cheater.  
 The second analysis used the emotion words as the independent variables. Surprisingly, 
none of them were significantly related to the dependent variable. The third analysis used the 
action words as the dependent variables.  The only significant variable was “physically hurt 
them” (R2=.09, df=149, F=15.8, p<.0001).  
 Sex differences in altruistic punishment were examined by dividing the responses into 
three categories: willing to pay nothing (n=80), willing to pay between 1-99 dollars (n=30), and 
willing to pay greater than 100 dollars (n=37). Males are more frequent in the third category but 
the difference is not statistically significant (X2=4.75, df=2, p=.09).  
 A similar set of analyses was conducted for altruistic helping using the question “What is 
the most you would be willing to give?” as the dependent variable. When the other basic 
questions were used as the independent variables, the total R2 was .13 (df=156, F=12.2, p<.0001) 
with two variables retained in the following order: How much they would like to help the person 
(t=4.93, p<.0001, DR2=.10), and a negative correlation with anger toward non-helpers (t=-2.24, 
p=.0265, DR2=.02).  In the second analysis, none of the emotion words were related. In the third 
analysis, the only significant action variable was “help if very serious” (R2=.04, df=151, F=6.94, 
p<.01). There was no sex difference in the amount that participants were willing to give 
(X2=1.43, df=2, p=.49).  
 
Discussion 
 
The most notable result of the O’Gorman et al. study (2005) was that altruistic 
punishment is insensitive to genetic relatedness and potential for future interactions, in contrast 
to altruistic helping. The current study used an inventory of emotion and action words to provide 
a better indicator of psychological mechanisms. Our results show that participants are sensitive 
to genetic relatedness in their response to a social transgression, in contrast to the earlier study. A 
cheating cousin provokes a greater negative emotional reaction than a cheating stranger. 
However, the more negative emotional response does not lead directly to a more negative 
behavioral response. Instead, the behavioral response is modulated in a way that is more negative 
toward relatives in some respects (confronting and seeking an apology) and more negative 
toward strangers in other respects (warning others about the transgression).  
Another complex relationship between emotions and actions exist for altruistic helping.  
At the emotional level, participants responded equally to the misfortune of relative and a 
stranger, but the undifferentiated emotional response led to very different actions; active helping 
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in the case of relatives and avoidance in the case of strangers. Having the participants respond to 
an inventory of emotion and action words is a simple and effective technique for identifying 
these complex relationships.  
No consistent pattern emerges for the potential for future interactions. O’Gorman et al. 
(2005) showed no effect for punishment in two replicated experiments and a strong effect for 
helping in a single experiment. However, we show no effect for any of our treatments in both 
helping and punishing scenarios, a discrepancy that will require future studies to resolve. 
 Both studies reveal a response to cheating that at first seems paradoxical: Most 
participants are very angry and think that the cheater should be punished, but over half are 
unwilling to pay even a penny to accomplish the job. These individuals are not necessarily 
hypocritical, however, because human life affords many ways to punish cheaters at little or no 
personal expense, such as gossiping to undermine their reputation (Wilson, Wilczynski, Wells, 
and Weiser, 2000) or avoiding future interactions (Wilson and Dugatkin, 1997). These forms of 
punishment can provide a potent outlet for individuals who are very angry but unwilling to invest 
their own resources.  
The remaining individuals indicate a stronger commitment to “put their money where 
their mouth is” by punishing cheaters at their own expense, in amounts ranging from modest to 
far greater than what they ($20) or anyone else ($200) lost, as if punishing transgressions is a 
matter of principle (Frank, 1988; Hirshleifer, 1987). The commitment to punish at one’s own 
expense is not a simple function of emotional intensity.  In fact, there is a weak inverse 
correlation between the degree of anger and the amount that participants were willing to pay in 
the first multiple regression analysis. The strongest correlations were with how much the cheater 
should pay, one’s own temptation to cheat, and anger toward others who don’t punish.  
A positive correlation between temptation to cheat and willingness to punish other 
cheaters is one of the most interesting results of this study. It raises the possibility that “altruistic 
punishment” is in fact selfish, a strategy employed by cheaters to eliminate competition from 
other cheaters. Eldakar, Farrell, and Wilson (2006) have investigated this possibility in a 
computer simulation model that emulates a public goods situation similar to our fictional 
scenario and experimental economics games. Even when helping and punishment are initially 
uncorrelated traits, a positive correlation between cheating and propensity to punish other 
cheaters robustly emerges from the model, suggesting that our empirical result might prove to be 
quite general.  
The psychological mechanisms the lead to helping and punishment are complex, 
including emotional responses that are modulated by other mechanisms to produce behaviors 
appropriate to given situations and people. Anger can lead to avoidance, aggression, diplomacy, 
or inaction if the costs are too great. Sympathy can lead to direct helping (such as stopping to aid 
an accident victim), indirect helping (such as calling 911), or inaction (such as emotionally 
responding to a charitable appeal but failing to give money). A combination of methods will be 
required to fully understand these mechanisms.  This study shows that fictional scenarios provide 
a useful tool that can be used in combination with other tools, such as computer simulation 
models and studies of actual behavior.   
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